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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
This appeal, arising out of a claim for pension benefits 
under ERISA, is set in the familiar factual pattern of an 
employee's being denied a more advantageous pension 
because of a minor shortfall in the required period of 
service. Robert J. Harte had accrued credit for fourteen 
years, eleven months, and eleven days at Bethlehem Steel 
when the benefits plan administrator terminated his 
continuous service (for pension purposes) because Harte 
had been absent from work for two years. When Harte's 
service was terminated, he was nineteen days short of 
eligibility for the "70/80" pension he now seeks. Harte 
claims that he did not learn that his service had been 
"broken," and hence that he had not accrued the fifteen 
years required for the pension, until approximately eight 
years later. After finally being notified of his shortfall, Harte 
sued, raising a host of arguments for why Bethlehem was 
required to give him the 70/80 pension, including 
arguments as to why his continuous service should never 
have been severed. The District Court granted summary 
judgment for Bethlehem. 
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Harte's strongest claim is a breach of fiduciary duty 
claim. He argues that (1) the plan document was 
ambiguous about when a break in service would be 
effected, (2) he reasonably believed that he was still 
employed under the terms of the plan, and therefore (3) 
Bethlehem, as an ERISA fiduciary, should have at least 
notified him that it was about to break his service. The 
primary issue presented by this appeal is whether ERISA 
requires plan administrators, as fiduciaries, to timely 
inform plan beneficiaries that their service is being broken 
if the severance is made pursuant to an ambiguous plan 
provision that a reasonable person could interpret 
differently from the administrator. We conclude that it does, 
giving rise to the ancillary issues of whether the plan 
provision is ambiguous, whether it is material, and whether 
Harte detrimentally relied on it. 
 
The phrase at issue in this case is "compensable 
disability." The Bethlehem plan provides that an employee 
may receive a 70/80 pension after fifteen years of 
"continuous service." It states that although continuous 
service is broken two years after leaving work for a 
disability, it is not broken if the reason for leaving is a 
"compensable disability incurred during course of 
employment." Bethlehem represents that the plan 
administrator, within his authority, has consistently 
interpreted this phrase to apply only to work-related 
disabilities that are compensated by state worker's 
compensation, which Harte did not receive. However, Harte 
applied for, received, and continues to receive, 
compensation for his disability through the company's long 
term disability program. On this ground, he contends that 
his service should never have been broken because he has 
a "compensable disability incurred during course of 
employment." He submits that the term "compensable 
disability" is ambiguous as to whether it comprehends long 
term disability benefits as well as worker's compensation 
benefits. 
 
Although we agree with Bethlehem that the plan 
administrator had the authority to make the interpretation 
that he did and to effect the severance, our precedent 
requires us to conclude that the company also had a 
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fiduciary duty to timely inform Harte of its interpretation. 
We have consistently held that a fiduciary may not make 
inconsistent or confusing statements or fail to disclose 
material facts about a plan. It follows that when a material 
plan provision regarding severance is ambiguous and 
beneficiaries might predictably rely on an alternate 
interpretation, a fiduciary may be held liable for failing to 
inform them that their service has been broken at a time at 
which they could attempt corrective action or seek 
alternatives. 
 
In short, a plaintiff may succeed on a claim under 
S 502(a)(3) of ERISA when he adduces evidence that (1) a 
plan provision is material; (2) it is susceptible of multiple 
reasonable interpretations; (3) the plaintiff relied on it to his 
detriment; and (4) the company did not timely notify the 
plaintiff of its interpretation. We therefore vacate the grant 
of summary judgment and remand the case for further 
proceedings on the breach of fiduciary duty claim. 1 The 
District Court properly granted summary judgment for 
Bethlehem on all other issues, and we affirm summarily 
with respect to these claims.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Bethlehem argues that Harte should not be allowed to proceed on this 
claim because it was inadequately pled. Harte did not cite S 502(a)(3) in 
his complaint, nor did he seek to amend the complaint. His complaint 
does, however, allege the lack of notification, and his papers refer to 
several cases that revolve around S 502(a)(3) claims. Moreover, the 
District Court discussed this claim in the context of one of those cases, 
Bixler v. Central Pa. Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292 
(3rd Cir. 1993) (a breach of fiduciary duty case that we discuss more 
fully infra Section II). We are satisfied that, given our broad notice 
pleading standards, Harte's breach of fiduciary duty claim has been 
adequately pled. 
 
2. Harte contends that, given the ambiguity of the plan provisions, 
Bethlehem could not interpret the plan in a fashion that inhered to its 
own benefit. However, under the aegis of Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. 
v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 114-15 (1989), when an ERISA plan provides the 
plan administrator with fiduciary discretion, courts generally use the 
arbitrary and capricious standard to review the administrator's 
decisions. Paragraphs 5.3(a) and 8.1 of the Bethlehem plan grant the 
administrator the discretion to interpret the "continuous service" 
provision. Even where the company is both the plan sponsor and plan 
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I. 
 
As far as is pertinent to this appeal, Harte worked at 
Bethlehem in several capacities between 1973 and 1986.3 
On January 27, 1986, Harte, then a project engineer, left 
work because of cardiac problems (angina from a prior 
anteriolateral myocardial infarction). He did notfile for, or 
receive, state worker's compensation benefits. He did, 
however, file for, and receive, long term disability (LTD) 
benefits through the company's benefits program, which he 
was still receiving as of the date he filed the present 
lawsuit. On January 27, 1988, after crediting Harte with 14 
years, 11 months, and 11 days of "continuous service," 
Bethlehem terminated his service. This left Harte nineteen 
days short of being eligible for pensions which would 
provide greater benefits than the deferred vested pension to 
which he is currently entitled. 
 
The Bethlehem Plan provides that continuous service 
breaks two years after active employment ends due to layoff 
or a disability, but does not break if an employee leaves 
active employment due to a "compensable disability 
incurred during course of employment."4  Michael Dopera, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
administrator we have applied the arbitrary and capricious standard of 
Bruch. See Abnathya v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 2 F.3d 40, 45 n.5 (3d 
Cir. 1993). Applying that standard, Bethlehem's plan administrator did 
not abuse his discretion when he concluded that Harte did not have a 
"compensable disability incurred during course of employment." 
Reviewing the documents available to him, there was no clear indication 
that his disability was work-based, and it was within the plan 
administrator's discretion to conclude that those on worker's 
compensation should be credited for continuous service for the time that 
they were on worker's compensation, while those who left for other 
disability-based reasons should not be so credited. The issue decided in 
the text is, of course, a different one. 
 
3. Harte also worked for Bethlehem briefly in 1952 and again between 
1962 and 1967. His claim that his previous service must be used to 
calculate the time he can credit towards his pension claims is patently 
without merit and we reject it without further discussion. 
 
4. In section 5.1 the term "continuous service" is defined (emphasis 
added): 
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plan administrator of the Bethlehem Pension Plan, testified 
by deposition that he broke Harte's continuous service in 
January 1988, because he left for medical reasons but did 
not have a "compensable disability" within the meaning of 
the plan. According to Dopera, "compensable disability 
incurred during course of employment" has always been 
interpreted by his office to apply only to those disabilities 
"where the recipient is getting worker's compensation 
benefits." Dopera conceded that there was no document 
available to the employees in which this interpretation was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       The term "continuous service" as used in this Plan means 
       continuous service in the employ of one or more of the Employing 
       Companies, except as in this Section 5 otherwise provided, prior to 
       retirement calculated from the Employee's last hiring date (this 
       means in the case of a break in continuous service, continuous 
       service shall be calculated from the date of reemployment following 
       the last unremoved break in continuous service) in accordance with 
       the following provisions; provided, however, that the last hiring 
date 
       prior to the effective date of this Plan shall be based on the 
practices 
       in effect at the time the break occurred: 
 
       (a) There shall be no deduction for any time lost which does not 
       constitute a break in continuous service, except that in 
       determining length of continuous service for pension purposes: 
 
         (1) that portion of any absence which continues beyond two 
       years from commencement of absence due to a layoff or 
       disability shall not be creditable as continuous service; 
       provided, however, that absence in excess of two years due to 
       a compensable disability incurred during course of employment 
       shall be creditable as continuous service, if the Employee is 
       returned to work or retires within 30 days afterfinal payment 
       of statutory compensation for such disability or after the end 
       of the period used in calculating lump sum payment 
 
         . . . 
 
       (b) Continuous service shall be broken by: 
 
         (4) absence which continue for more than two years, except 
       that (i) absence in excess of two years due to a compensable 
       disability incurred during course of employment shall not 
       break continuous service, provided the Employee is returned 
       to work or retires . . . .; (ii) if an Employee is absent on 
       account of layoff or disability in excess of two years . . . 
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announced or formalized. Nor did he suggest that the plan 
mandated that interpretation, but rather that the plan 
"provides that we have the right to interpret  provisions 
under the administration section. We interpret  the 
compensable disability occurred during course of 
employment to mean someone actually getting worker's 
compensation payments." (emphasis added). 
 
In November 1995, Harte received a letter stating that his 
continuous employment had been severed as of January 
27, 1988, seven years and ten months earlier, and that he 
was eligible for a deferred vested pension. He immediately 
objected and wrote several letters to the company. 
Bethlehem apologized for not informing him earlier, 
blaming the lack of official notice on a "clerical error." 
Bethlehem represents that it has a policy of notifying plan 
participants that their service has been broken shortly after 
the severance and there is no evidence that it does not 
generally do so, or that Bethlehem was acting in bad faith 
when it failed to notify Harte in 1988. 
 
Harte filed suit in District Court advancing several 
claims. As far is as is relevant for this appeal, the Court 
rejected Harte's contention that Bethlehem had an 
obligation to notify him when he was severed because: (1) 
it concluded that there was no evidence that Bethlehem 
had acted in bad faith; and (2) it believed that there was no 
fiduciary obligation to inform Harte that his service had 
broken. The Court granted summary judgment across the 
board for Bethlehem, and this appeal followed.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We exercise plenary review over such a decision, see Olson v. General 
Elec. Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947, 951 (3d Cir. 1996), and apply the same 
test the District Court should have applied in thefirst instance, see 
Lawrence v. National Westminster Bank, New Jersey , 98 F.3d 61, 65 (3d 
Cir. 1996). We must therefore determine whether the record, when 
viewed in the light most favorable to Harte, shows that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and that defendants are entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. See Salley v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 160 
F.3d 977, 980 (3d Cir. 1998). 
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II. 
 
Harte seeks equitable relief under ERISA S 502(a)(3) 
(codified at 29 U.S.C. S 1132(a)(3)), a"catchall" provision, 
which "act[s] as a safety net, offering appropriate equitable 
relief for injuries caused by violations that S 502 does not 
elsewhere adequately remedy," including violations of S 404. 
Varity v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 512 (1996). The alleged 
violation of ERISA involves S 404 (codified at 29 U.S.C. 
S 1104), which defines fiduciary duties owed by plan 
administrators to their beneficiaries.6  
 
       In its declaration of policy, ERISA states: 
 
       [O]wing to the lack of employee information and 
       adequate safeguards concerning their operation, it is 
       desirable in the interests of employees and their 
       beneficiaries . . . that disclosure be made and 
       safeguards be provided with respect to the 
       establishment, operation, and administration of such 
       plans. 
 
       . . . 
 
       It is hereby declared to be the policy of this chapter to 
       protect . . . the interests of participants in employee 
       benefit plans and their beneficiaries, by requiring the 
       disclosure and reporting to participants and 
       beneficiaries of financial and other information with 
       respect thereto, by establishing standards of conduct, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Section 404(a)(1) provides that: 
 
       a fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan 
solely in 
       the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and-- 
 
       (A) for the exclusive purpose of: 
 
       (i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and 
 
       (ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan; 
 
       (B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the 
       circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like 
       capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct 
       of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims; 
 
       . . . 
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       responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of 
       employee benefit plans, and by providing for 
 
       appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to 
       the Federal courts. 
 
29 U.S.C. SS 1001(a),(b). 
 
In interpreting similar claims, we have looked to these 
statements and noted that ERISA was enacted, in part, to 
ensure that employees receive sufficient information about 
their rights under employee benefit plans to make well- 
informed employment and retirement decisions. See Jordan 
v. Federal Express Corp., 116 F.3d 1005, 1012 (3rd Cir. 
1997). The goals of the "fiduciary duty jurisprudence" 
arising out of ERISA are " `to protect and strengthen the 
rights of employees, to enforce fiduciary standards, and to 
encourage the development of private retirement plans.' " Id. 
at 1014 (quoting In re Unisys Savings Plan Litig., 74 F.3d 
420, 434 (3d Cir. 1996)). 
 
These ends are partially served through ERISA's 
reporting requirements. But the fiduciary duty to disclose 
and explain is not achieved solely by technical compliance 
with the statutory notice requirements. In In re Unisys 
Corp. Retiree Med. Benefit "ERISA" Litig. , 57 F.3d 1255 
(1995), we stated that 
 
       satisfaction by an employer as plan administrator of its 
       statutory disclosure obligations under ERISA does not 
       foreclose the possibility that the plan administrator 
       may nonetheless breach its fiduciary duty owed plan 
       participants to communicate candidly, if the plan 
       administrator simultaneously or subsequently makes 
       material misrepresentations to those whom the duty of 
       loyalty and prudence are owed. 
 
Id. at 1264. 
 
The contours of these duties must be defined by the 
courts in "develop[ing] a federal common law of rights and 
obligations under ERISA-regulated plans." Varity, 516 U.S. 
at 497 (citing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 
U.S. 101, 110-11(1989)). Administrators have a fiduciary 
duty "not to misinform employees through material 
misrepresentations and incomplete, inconsistent or 
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contradictory disclosures." Unisys, 57 F.3d at 1264. Not all 
misleading statements or omissions by a fiduciary are 
actionable, only those that are material. A representation or 
omission is material if "there is a substantial likelihood that 
it would mislead a reasonable employee in making an 
adequately informed retirement decision." Unisys, 57 F.3d 
at 1264. The issue of materiality is a matter for the fact- 
finder if reasonable minds can differ on whether a 
misleading statement or omission would affect a reasonable 
employee's retirement decision. See Fischer v. Philadelphia 
Elec. Co., 994 F.2d 130, 135 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
This case does not involve affirmative misrepresentations. 
However, we have made clear that a fiduciary not only has 
a negative duty not to misrepresent material facts to plan 
beneficiaries, but also a corresponding affirmative duty to 
speak "when the trustee knows that silence might be 
harmful." Bixler v. Central Pa. Teamsters Health & Welfare 
Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 1300 (3rd Cir. 1993). The duty 
extends to "those material facts, known to thefiduciary but 
unknown to the beneficiary, which the beneficiary must 
know for its own protection." Glaziers & Glassworkers 
Union Local No. 252 Annuity Fund v. Newbridge Sec., Inc., 
93 F.3d 1171, 1182 (3rd Cir. 1996). "The duty to disclose 
material information is the core of a fiduciary's 
responsibility." Id. at 1281 (quoting Bixler, 12 F.3d at 
1300). 
 
In Bixler, a widow sued her husband's former employer 
for failing to provide complete and accurate information 
about her insurance options, a failure which she claimed 
harmed her by leading her not to select a particular option. 
See 12 F.3d at 1296. We held that an ERISA fiduciary who 
explains insurance benefits has a "duty to convey complete 
and accurate information," and remanded part of the case 
to the district court to determine whether material facts 
were withheld from her and if the defendant was acting as 
a fiduciary. Id. at 1302. 
 
In Jordan v. Federal Express Corp., 116 F.3d 1005, 1006- 
10 (3rd Cir. 1997), the plaintiff learned--only after 
retirement and divorce--that he could not transfer the 
benefits of his plan to his new wife, and that the plan was 
irrevocable. These details about the plan were in the plan 
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document itself, but Jordan never requested nor received a 
complete copy of the plan, and he claimed that he would 
have chosen a different plan had he known. He did receive 
a written summary of his retirement options that did not 
include a reference to irrevocability. Nonetheless, we held 
that a reasonable fact finder could conclude that, despite 
its full compliance with ERISA and plan-based reporting 
requirements, the plan administrator had breached its 
fiduciary duty by failing to provide him this information. 
See id. at 1016. 
 
Bethlehem argues that Jordan is distinguishable because 
in Jordan the plan administrator had already acted and 
provided incomplete information. See id. at 1016-17. It 
contends that sending Jordan information triggered a duty 
to provide complete information about the plan, and since 
Bethlehem did not provide any information, a duty of 
completeness cannot have been triggered here. This 
argument fails for two reasons. First, the Jordan panel did 
not base the duty to inform completely on the company's 
prior limited effort at communication. See id.  Second, 
providing a written plan is itself an affirmative act. In a 
plan, as in a summary plan document, beneficiaries have 
reason to expect that complete information about all 
material provisions is available to them when they review 
the document. Confusing or incomplete information in a 
plan is at least as likely to cause reliance on a reasonable 
misinterpretation as is confusing or incomplete information 
in a summary of the plan. Indeed, when a summary plan or 
letter includes incomplete information, the employee retains 
the possibility of reviewing the entire plan, whereas there 
are no more authoritative documents to review when the 
ambiguous provision is in the plan itself. 
 
Therefore, we conclude that there is an incomplete 
disclosure when, as in this case, a material plan provision, 
easily accessible by a beneficiary, uses terms that are 
susceptible to reasonable misinterpretation and detrimental 
reliance thereon. Naturally, in considering the 
"reasonableness" of a beneficiary's interpretation, the 
company's own pronouncements and widely-known 
company practice must be taken into account; if a company 
adequately informs beneficiaries of its interpretation of a 
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term (when it retains discretion to interpret), it would be 
patently unreasonable to understand it otherwise. 7 The 
"duty to convey complete and accurate information," Bixler, 
12 F.3d at 1302, logically encompasses a duty to use clear 
language when describing material terms in a plan, or 
explain it when it is unclear. The failure to notify a 
beneficiary that his or her service is being broken pursuant 
to an ambiguous provision falls within the category of 
breaches of duty for "failure to disclose" outlined in Bixler, 
Jordan, Glaziers, and Unisys. 
 
III. 
 
Applying this framework, we conclude that Bethlehem 
should not have been granted summary judgment on 
Harte's breach of fiduciary duty claim. The term 
"compensable disability incurred during the course of 
employment" is a material term in the context of the plan. 
The meaning of the phrase affects whether one's 
employment is considered continuous or broken off, and a 
fiduciary acting with care, skill, and prudence would know 
that an employee would want--and need--to know whether 
his or her disability fell within this category. It is the kind 
of phrase that is likely to "mislead a reasonable employee in 
making an adequately informed retirement decision." 
Unisys, 57 F.3d at 1264. If Harte knew that he was not 
included in this category, he could have tried to return to 
less strenuous work for at least nineteen days, or 
attempted to find work, either at Bethlehem or elsewhere, 
that would allow him to receive better insurance, or he 
could have encouraged his wife to seek employment that 
would better insure them both. 
 
       The disputed phrase is: 
 
       [A]bsence in excess of two years due to a compensable 
       disability incurred during course of employment shall 
       not break continuous service. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Although we focus on Bethlehem's failure to notify in this case, we 
note that it could just as easily have fulfilled its fiduciary duties by 
using 
clear language in the plan--i.e., a statement that"compensable 
disability" only applied to individuals receiving state worker's 
compensation. 
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Bethlehem claims that this phrase has consistently been 
interpreted to cover only those cases where a participant 
applied for and received worker's compensation for a work- 
related injury. However, Dopera himself called his reading 
of the phrase an "interpretation," suggesting that the 
language did not mandate a particular result. Although the 
phrase could refer only to those disabilities arising out of 
work, a reasonable person could also read this phrase to 
apply to any disability, illness, or injury that came upon an 
employee during the broad time frame of "active 
employment." Certainly, someone such as Harte who was 
actually receiving compensation for his medical condition 
through Bethlehem's long term disability program could 
think that he had suffered a "compensable disability."8 
There is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the 
phrase is susceptible of multiple reasonable interpretations. 
 
Of course, this phrase cannot be read in a vacuum, and 
it is possible that Bethlehem will present evidence at trial 
that will demonstrate that in the context of employment 
with that company, it was not reasonable to expect that the 
phrase would be differently interpreted. However, 
construing the facts in the light most favorable to Harte, as 
we must at this juncture, we conclude that the phrase was 
susceptible to at least two reasonable interpretations, one 
of which would cover someone like Harte, who was 
receiving compensation through long term disability 
benefits. 
 
As to the detrimental reliance question, Bethlehem 
argues that there is insufficient evidence that Harte relied 
on his misinterpretation of the plan. Therefore, the 
argument continues, since no harm flowed from the failure 
of communication, the failure to notify should not be 
actionable. Harte counters that had he learned of his 
severance, either immediately or within a short time 
afterwards, he would have taken several steps. He submits 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Harte also claims that his illness was due in part to the stress of 
work, and adduced evidence that his doctor, at the time he left 
Bethlehem, concurred in this view. This evidence adds weight to his 
claim that he reasonably believed that his disability was "incurred 
during the course of his employment." 
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that he could have gone back to work for nineteen days and 
then attempted to join those days to his previous fourteen 
odd years (as the plan allows), or, alternatively, he could 
have applied for different pensions or invested in separate 
insurance. Although Harte has not put evidence in the 
record of alternate pensions for which he could have 
applied, we believe that he could have at least attempted to 
return to work. 
 
Bethlehem notes that he had no absolute right to return 
to work, and that Harte was physically infirm and 
incapable of working according to his own physician. 
However, just as we cannot assume that Bethlehem would 
have accepted a petition for such a brief tour of duty, we 
similarly cannot assume that it would not have. Harte had 
cardiac troubles, and now claims that he has Parkinson's 
disease. Although these disabilities may be incompatible 
with long term labor, Harte might have been able to put in 
a few weeks of consulting (his work did not require heavy 
labor) to achieve his desired pension, and Bethlehem might 
have accommodated him. Moreover, as noted above, Harte 
could have sought out alternate sources of insurance. We 
are satisfied that although Harte had no absolute right to 
return to work and possibly lacked the ability to do so, a 
reasonable jury could conclude, even on this spare record, 
that had he known that he was no longer receiving credit 
for "continuous service" he could have acted in a way to 
protect himself.9 Now, eight years later, his physical 
condition may have deteriorated such that he can no longer 
obtain the protections he might previously have sought. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Bethlehem also argues that even if it had a duty to notify Harte, it 
would not apply to the moment of discharge, but rather, as is its policy, 
"within a reasonable period following a break in service." Therefore, 
"[t]he 
date on which Plaintiff received a Notice of Deferred Vested Pension 
could not possibly alter the benefits to which he is entitled under the 
Plan." However, Bethlehem's internal policy of notification does not 
circumscribe its fiduciary duties under ERISA. If ERISA requires that 
fiduciaries notify individuals of ambiguities in plan documents if they 
might reasonably be respected to rely, to their detriment, on an incorrect 
reading of an ambiguity, a company may not avoid this duty by 
establishing a lesser reporting requirement for itself. 
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It may seem that any one who was away from the 
company as long as Harte was would have to know that 
they had been severed. But Harte continued to receive long 
term disability payments, and considered himself a disabled 
employee, instead of a disabled ex-employee. In sum, we 
believe that a jury could conclude that Harte was not even 
on constructive notice of Bethlehem's policy of interpreting 
the plan provision, or of his own severance. 
 
In view of the foregoing, the judgment with respect to the 
claim for a breach of fiduciary duty for failure to notify will 
be vacated, and the case remanded to the District Court for 
further proceedings. In all other respects the judgment will 
be affirmed. Parties to bear their own costs. 
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